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1. Introduction 
This paper deals with the benefits of social pacts from the point of view of the economic 
system as a whole and their costs to the trade unions and the various possibilities to 
facilitate their stipulation. 
The economic literature, from Barro and Gordon (1983b) to Lawler (2000a, 2000b; 
2001) or Efthimiadis (2007), has put the strategic opposition of interests between unions 
and the government to the forefront of the analysis. In such a context economists have 
discussed three main often interrelated solutions to improve the macroeconomic 
                                                 
* We thank Jelle Visser for comments on a previous draft. 
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performance: the conservative central banker, union coordination (centralization), and 
corporatism (the cooperative solution between the government and the union).1  
The conservative central banker has characterized the discussion since its very 
beginning, from Barro and Gordon (1983b) to Soskice and Iversen (1998, 2000) and 
Coricelli et al. (2004, 2006), but with some opposition (see Cubitt, 1992; Skott, 1997; 
Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Guzzo and Velasco, 1999; Lawler, 2000a, 2001). The 
central idea of advocates of central bank conservativeness is to create a credible 
commitment to a non inflationary policy, thus eliminating the inflation bias. However, a 
full commitment results to be sub-optimal if short-run fluctuations are considered, since 
in this case output variability is not stabilized; a conservative central banker would 
guarantee a better performance in the case of supply shocks (Rogoff, 1985). More 
recently, Coricelli et al. (2004, 2006) have shown that a conservative central banker can 
result beneficial also because it eliminates negative wage externalities in decentralized 
wage-setting systems2. However, in such a case the conservative central banker is just 
an imperfect substitute for the lack of union coordination (Guzzo and Velasco, 1999) 
and wage centralization may be a Pareto superior solution (Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 
2004).3 
A parallel strand of analysis, also begun with Barro and Gordon (1983b), has focused 
on the possibility of reaching Pareto superior equilibria by implementing some kind of 
cooperative solution. This is the strand we are mainly interested in, but – as we will see 
– this solution interacts with that of a conservative central banker. By considering 
repeated games, Barro and Gordon (1983b) and followers have shown that Pareto 
superior equilibria may emerge as an effect of creating a reputation. However, this line 
of research has two main shortcomings: first, the conditions required to support 
cooperative Pareto-superior solutions are rather restrictive; second, the cooperative 
solution that can emerge in this strand of analysis improves the macroeconomic 
                                                 
1  See inter alia Cubitt (1992, 1995), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Guzzo and Velasco (1999), 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001), Jerger (2002), Lippi (2003), Coricelli et al (2004, 2006), Efthimiadis 
(2007), Acocella et al. (2008). See also Gärtner (2000) and Cukierman (2004). The former surveys the 
traditional approach; the latter summarizes recent developments combining the labor and goods market 
monopolistic distortions. 
2 In fact, multi-union wage setting implies well-known negative externalities. The one which is most 
relevant from an empirical point of view is the wage externality: An increase in one union nominal (real) 
wage results in a price increase and thus in a reduction of the real wage of the other unions. 
3 Assuming the existence of only one union – as we will do in this paper – avoids confusing the issue of 
the absence of union coordination with that of a strategic conflict between the union(s) and the 
government. 
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performance only in so far as inflation is concerned, which is not the central point of 
many social pacts. 
More interesting from our perspective are the attempts to describe cooperative solutions 
in one-shot games as the result of explicit social pacts. Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), 
Cubitt (1995), Burda (1997), Acocella et al. (2007, 2009b) show that corporatism is a 
possible solution to the conflict between the union(s) and the government, capable of 
guaranteeing a better macroeconomic performance in terms of both inflation and 
employment. However, a problem of discovering the conditions favoring acceptance of 
social pacts may arise with respect to both this and the previous solution (i.e., that of the 
central bank reputation), as the parties involved tend to pursue their own interests 
(Avdagic et al, 2005). 4  In fact, the union preference function may fail to include 
inflation while certainly including the real wage rate, which tends to be inversely related 
to employment: the higher level of employment guaranteed in many cases by 
corporatism raises the union utility level; however, since it implies a lower real wage 
rate, it could finally reduce the union satisfaction (Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 2007). 
If this is the case, on the one side, lower inflation would not be attractive for the union; 
on the other, it would be damaged by a higher employment level.  
In this paper we explicitly consider compensation to the union as a condition which may 
be more or less needed for the conclusion of social pacts, under different preferences of 
the parties involved. More specifically, we make use of a model able to capture three 
different institutional setups in order to try to explain different circumstances favoring 
the stipulation of social pacts. This model encompasses as particular cases previous 
models analyzing the conflict between unions and the government in one-shot games 
(i.e. Barro and Gordon, 1983a; Detken and Gartner, 1992; Gylfason and Lindbeck, 1994; 
Efthimiadis, 2007). 
                                                 
4  We have indicated the existence of a problem of choosing between different analytic routes for 
explaining how a social pact can emerge even if one of the parties involved does not gain from the 
superior macroeconomic performance. These different routes might not be alternative one another as in 
the real life we find different types of cooperative agreements (see Rhodes 1998, 2001; Avdagic et al., 
2005). There are cases of long term, well-institutionalized and comprehensive, concertation as well as 
cases of short-medium term, episodic and with narrow wage targets, social pacts. In principle we could 
model them differently. More specifically, the former could be modelled as the outcome of a repeated 
game, whereas the latter could be the outcome of one shot games. For the sake of simplicity we prefer not 
to make this distinction, which might be carried out with more complicated models. In any case, a 
problem of feasibility would arise in both cases.  
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The various solutions we consider from a theoretical point of view to the problem of 
feasibility of social pacts have a factual counterpart.  
Social pacts have been experienced mainly, but not only, in Europe after WWII in a 
large number of countries and situations (see, among others, Summers et al., 1993; 
Rhodes, 1998, 2001; Visser, 2002, 2007). The abundance of cases of social pacts first 
means that some of the conditions favoring their conclusions must be met in practice.  
The circumstances in which social pacts are stipulated can throw light on other aspects 
of the issue. In most cases, at least for the first-generation pacts, 5 compensation can 
take a number of forms, such as issue linkages, political exchange or delegation of 
public functions to the unions. In other cases no compensation is apparently granted by 
the government to unions, which could even be charged with some loss of previously 
gained transfers. This is the case of some explicit or implicit pacts drawn in the 1970s 
and early 1980s in the presence of high inflation in Italy and other countries as well as 
of the second-generation social pacts, reached in peripheral Europe in the 1990s for the 
purpose of facilitating the satisfaction of the Maastricht criteria for accession to the 
EMU (e.g. Regini, 1997; Hanckè, 2006). In this case the union’s inflation aversion or a 
sort of partisanship could be a substitute for the compensation.  
Not in all cases are social pacts subscribed by the government, as for Sweden and 
Austria. At a first glance this fact could be interpreted as an absence of compensation to 
unions. On the contrary, it could simply mean that substitutes for compensation - like 
partisanship -  that are more explicit in other cases (Alvarez et al., 1993) are operating 
to favor the social pact. Partisanship may be interpreted in various ways; in any case, it 
is a form of ‘generalized compensation’: in supporting a government a union expects 
some kind of benefit accruing to it from the government re-election. Finally, in many 
cases the conservatism of the government (intended in a loose way, to include monetary 
authorities) could act as a kind of substitute for compensation or reduce the amount of it 
needed (e.g. Skott, 1997; Bleaney, 1996; Oateley, 1999; Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 
2004). 
                                                 
5 In the 1960s and 1970s first-generation social pacts tended to exchange wage moderation for increases 
in public expenditures, whereas the second-generation social pacts of the 1990s apparently exchanged 
wage moderation for public expenditure cuts (Summers et al., 1993; Visser, 2002).  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays the economic set up for the 
analysis. Section 3 discusses the different solutions to the problem of acceptance of 
social pacts by unions. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The economic benchmark 
We consider a simple economic benchmark where the employment gap is endogenously 
determined by a strategic private sector organized in an all-encompassing union. The 
model harbors three different institutional scenarios. It can describe the standard case of 
the long-run6 monetary policy neutrality à la Barro and Gordon (1983a). By considering 
the union inflation aversion,7 it can also introduce the case of non-neutrality, since the 
government is able to affect employment as in Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) or Cubitt 
(1995). Finally, by considering a partisan union we introduce the possibility of a 
business cycle as in Detken and Gärtner (1992): if the union supports (dislikes) the 
current government, it will follow a more moderate (aggressive) wage policy. 
The model formally consists of four equations: 
(1) n wπ= −  
(2) n m π= − . 
(3) 2 2
2 2
VV nκβ π= − −  
(4) ( ) 2 2
2 2
UU w n Vκ ηα π π= − − − +Ω  
where n is the employment gap with respect to the potential (competitive) level, m is the 
nominal money growth rate, w is the wage growth rate, π is the inflation rate, w π−  is 
the real wage premium with respect to the competitive real wage. Equation (1) and (2) 
describe the supply and demand sides of the economy. Equation (1) is a profit 
maximization condition and equation (2) a quantitative equation. Equation (4) defines a 
standard preference function for the government that aims to achieve the potential 
output and stabilize inflation. Equation (3) is the private sector’s loss function, which 
linearly increases in the wage premium.  
                                                 
6 As usual in this literature, long-run is here defined in Friedman’s sense, i.e. the time occurring for the 
expectations to be adjusted. 
7 Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) or Cubitt (1995), Efthimiadis (2007). Criticism against this assumption 
has been levelled, among others, by Berger et al. (2004). See Cukierman (2004) for a different point of 
view. 
Eliminato: (1)
Eliminato: (2)
Eliminato: (1)
Eliminato: (2)
Eliminato: (4)
Eliminato: (3)
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We assume 0β η> ≥  and ( )2 ,1 .U Vκ κΩ∈ −  The meaning of these technical 
assumptions is as follows. The former simply states that, even if the union is inflation 
averse, it is less so than the government; the latter implies that even if the union is 
partisan it cares about the result of the election less than the supported party. As claimed, 
the model harbors three different common setups, according to the values of these 
parameters:8  
1) The Barro-Gordon model, when 0η = , 0Ω = . We refer to this case as ‘the 
standard scenario.’  
2) The Gylfason-Lindbeck model,9 when 0η > , 0Ω = . We refer to this case as ‘the 
inflation-averse union scenario.’  
3) The Detken-Gärtner model, when 0η = , 0Ω ≠ . We refer to this case as ‘the 
partisan scenario.’ 
In the standard scenario the non cooperative Nash equilibrium is easily found as: 
(5) *
U
n ακ= −  
(6) * V
U
καπ β κ=  
As is well known, an inflation bias – as indicated by (6) – arises and Barro and Gordon 
(1983b) suggest it to be removed by the government (or central bank) commitment.  
In the inflation-averse union case the Nash equilibrium is:  
(7) *
U V
n β αβκ ηκ= − +  
(8) * V
U V
κπ αβκ ηκ= +  
In this scenario the macroeconomic performance is better than in the previous one, but 
an inflationary bias still exists. 
Finally, by considering the partisan scenario, we have: 
(9) *
2U V
n ακ κ= − + Ω  
                                                 
8 See Di Bartolomeo (2007) for further details. 
9 This is the version of the Gylfason-Lindbeck model used and explained in Acocella and Ciccarone 
(1997). 
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(10) *
2
V
U V
καπ β κ κ= + Ω  
The performance ensured by this scenario depends on the attitude of the union with 
respect to the government. It will result better (worse) in both inflation and employment 
than in the Barro-Gordon case if the union supports (dislikes) the current government. 
 
 
3. Compensation and other institutions favoring social pacts. 
3.1 Augmenting the basic model by transfers 
The macroeconomic performance offered by non cooperative solutions can be improved 
by resorting to corporatism, i.e. cooperative social pacts between the union and the 
government, as shown in a number of papers (e.g., see Acocella and Di Bartolomeo, 
2007 and references therein). Corporatism is, however, apparently not in the interest of 
one of the two institutions, i.e. the union, which implies that it is hardly feasible. 
To reconcile our models with reality – where social pacts have been rather common in 
Europe at least – some kind of compensation10 must be given by the government to the 
union to induce it to sign a social pact. Our model already incorporates features that can 
be interpreted as a sort of compensation – the union’s inflation aversion and the 
partisanship – or could make social pacts more attractive, by improving non cooperative 
solutions, and then act as a substitute for compensation.  . 
By adding an explicit compensation to the model we can thus examine the interplay of 
different institutional features for the acceptance of social pacts by unions. If a transfer 
0t ≥  is paid by the government to the union, equations (3) and (4) change as follows:  
(11) V V t= −?  
(12) U U t= +? . 
The inclusion of a linear transfer does not affect the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
since, by considering equations (11) and (12), the Nash equilibrium is still given by (5)-
(10), according to the scenario, and in (11) and (12) t = 0. We can now calculate the 
cooperative solution.  
                                                 
10 In this term we include ‘issue linkages,’ ‘political exchange,’ delegation of public functions to unions, 
in addition to side payments, which are the most evident case of compensation.  We deal with these in 
Acocella et al. (2009a) more extensively. 
Eliminato: (11)
Eliminato: (12)
Eliminato: (5)
Eliminato: (10)
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3.2 The cooperative solution 
Formally, the cooperative solution is obtained by maximizing the Nash product: 
(13) ( ) ( )1* *N U U V Vδ δ−Π = − −? ?  
with respect to { }, ,w m t  subject to equations (1) and (2), ( )( )
2
2
*
2
V V
U V
V κ β κ βαβκ η β κ
+
+ +Ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= − and 
( )( )
( )
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 3*
2
V V V V U V V
U V
U
κ η βκ βηκ β κ κ β κ β κ βα
βκ η β κ
+Ω − − Ω − +
+ +Ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= −  are the utility levels corresponding to the non-
cooperative solution described by the previous section. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume an equal bargaining power for the two agents, i.e. 12δ −= .  
The cooperative solution is: 
(14) ( )1C U Vm
α
κ κ= − + +Ω  
(15) ( )1C U Vw
α
κ κ= + +Ω  
(16) ( )( ) ( )2 2 * *1 112 4 2C C U C V Ct n n n U Vα κ κ= + − +Ω + −  
(17’)  ( )1C U Vn
α
κ κ= − + +Ω  
(18’)  0Cπ =  
In the cooperative solution inflation is always zero, independently of any parameter, 
since both players share the same inflation target, which can be reached independently 
of the employment level, whereas employment, which is independent of the degree of 
conservatism, is a function of a multiplicity of parameters: it is higher the lower the 
weight put by the union on the real wage and the higher the weights put by both players 
on employment and the degree of partisanship.  
3.3 The standard case 
In the standard case (i.e. 0η =  and 0Ω = ), equations (14)-(16) imply: 
(17) ( )
2 2
2 2
31
4
C U V V
UU V
t κ κ κ αβ κκ κ
⎡ ⎤+= +⎢ ⎥+⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
(18) C
U V
n ακ κ= − +  
Eliminato: (1)
Eliminato: (2)
Eliminato: (14)
Eliminato: (16)
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(19) 0Cπ =  
As said above, economic outcomes (18) and (19) do not depend on the degree of 
conservativeness, but the compensation (17) does. The compensation paid by the 
government is always positive and is a direct function of the preference of the union for 
the real wage and the government preference for employment, whereas it is an inverse 
function of the degree of conservatism and the union’s preference for employment 
( 0C Ut κ∂ ∂ < , 0C Vt κ∂ ∂ >  and 0Ct β∂ ∂ < ). Conservatism has no effect on the gain in 
employment and influences the non cooperative inflation rate only. As the degree of 
conservatism rises, the reduction in inflation negatively influences the government’s 
ability to pay and, thus, the amount of the transfer. From this point of view we can say 
that conservatism is no substitute for transfers. 
3.4 The inflation-averse union 
In the case of an inflation-averse union (i.e. 0η > , 0Ω = ), equations (14)-(16) yield: 
(20) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 2
3
4
V U U V U VC
V
U V U V
t
βκ ηκ βκ ηκ κ κβ η κ ακ κ βκ ηκ
+ + + + += − + +  
(21) C
U V
n ακ κ= − +  
(22) 0Cπ =  
Now, an increase in the government’s inflation aversion tends to decrease the amount of 
the compensation to be paid to the union, while decreasing also the benefit of 
cooperating for the government. The net effect of conservatism on the amount of 
transfer is thus ambiguous (i.e. the sign of Ct β∂ ∂  is ambiguous). For high values of 
the union’s inflation aversion ( 2Uη κ> ) it is always 0Ct β∂ ∂ > . For low values of the 
union’s inflation aversion (i.e., 2Uη κ< ), Ct β∂ ∂  is positive only for small values of 
β.11 
There are thus cases in which conservatism can act as a substitute for transfers, which 
are more likely for high values of the union’s inflation aversion or, for lower values of 
this parameter, when also the degree of conservatism is low. 
3.5 The partisan union case 
                                                 
11 The results can be easily derived by differentiation.  
Eliminato: (18)
Eliminato: (19)
Eliminato: (17)
Eliminato: (14)
Eliminato: (16)
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In the case of a political partisan and inflation neutral union (i.e. 0, 0ηΩ ≠ = ) equations 
(14)-(16) imply: 
(23) ( )( )( )
( )
( )
2 2
2
2 2
6 3 11
4 21
V U V U V VC
U VU V
t
κ κ κ κ κ κ αβ κ κκ κ
⎡ ⎤Ω + + Ω+ + −Ω⎢ ⎥= +⎢ ⎥ + Ω+ +Ω⎣ ⎦
 
(24) ( )1C U Vn
α
κ κ= − + +Ω  
(25) 0Cπ =  
The transfer can be either positive or negative, according to the value of Ω. For values 
of Ω within the limits imposed it is always positive. It is a direct function of the 
preference of the union for the real wage, an inverse function of the degree of 
conservatism and the weight assigned to employment by the union. 
The derivative of t with respect to Ω is difficult to calculate in analytic terms. Numerical 
simulations show that it is negative: the more partisan is the union, the lower is the 
transfer it needs in order to stipulate a social pact. Employment is always higher (lower) 
than in the previous two cases if the union has (not) a partisan attitude towards the 
current government. 
Regarding the effects of conservativeness on transfer, an increase in β always reduces 
the amount of it (it is easy to verify that 0Ct β∂ ∂ < ). 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Corporatism guarantees a better macroeconomic performance, but might imply a net 
cost to the union. In fact, considering the usual models where the union’s loss function 
is a function of the real wage rate and employment only, the union could suffer from a 
higher level of employment, if it values this less than the corresponding wage restraint. 
The widespread existence of social pacts can be explained by introducing additional 
variables into usual models, such as side payments or union’s preference functions more 
complex than the usual ones.  
Side payments are often made to unions in various forms, such as transfers proper, issue 
linkages, political exchange or delegation of public functions.  
The union’s inflation aversion can also help to reduce (or eliminate) the cost of social 
pacts. In fact, if union dislikes inflation, it gains directly from the better macroeconomic 
Eliminato: (14)
Eliminato: (16)
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performance as it now gives a positive value to reduction in inflation. Union’s inflation 
aversion has been of the utmost importance in some countries (this is the case of 
Germany) for the whole period after WW II for historical reasons and at times (e.g., in 
the 1970s, the 1980s and the early 1990s) in other countries as well (in the last decade 
in conjunction with the need for disinflation related to the Maastricht criteria).12 
Partisanship can reduce inflation and increase employment even with little or no side 
payment and this can help explaining wage moderation and bipartite social pacts in the 
absence of explicit compensation, in countries where the other substitutes for 
compensation did not operate. 
The government’s degree of conservatism has no impact on cooperative solutions but 
always decreases non-cooperative inflation, thus reducing the gains from cooperation in 
terms of this variable, while decreasing (directly13) non cooperative employment only in 
the case of an inflation-averse union. It is a substitute for side payments in the standard 
and the partisan case (i.e., increases in the degree of conservatism reduce the amount of 
compensation to be paid), but it is not always so in the inflation-averse union case, 
where more conservatism can add to the amount of side payments to the unions under 
some circumstances.  
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